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Abstract 
 
Some countries face a national dilemma. Spain has rather a dilemma of nationalities. This is 
chiefly cultural and political with inter-regional disparities tending also to reinforce internal 
cleavages. Despite its secular conflicts of internal ethnoterritorial accommodation, Spain is 
an entity clearly identifiable as a country of countries, or a nation of nations. However, the 
social and cultural cohesion that makes up Spain’s unity does not obliterate its internal 
rivalries.  
After a long hyper-centralist dictatorship (1939-75), and peaceful transition to democracy 
(1975-79), Spain has undergone a process of deep decentralisation.  
The ‘open model’ of home-rule-all-round has evolved into a gradual process of top-down 
‘federalization’, despite that the Spanish 1978 Constitution does not include the word 
“federal” in any of its provisions.  
This paper analyses the main features of the ongoing process of ‘devolutionary federalism’ 
and provides with insights concerning the evolution of the competitive interplay among 
Spanish regions and nationalities.  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Kingdom of Spain is a compound national state that incorporates various degrees of 
internal ethnoterritorial plurality, including minority nations and regions. After a long hyper-
centralist dictatorship (1939-75), a peaceful transition to democracy (1975-79), and an 
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active European involvement following its accession to the EEC/EU (1986), Spain has 
undergone deep transformations as a multi-national state in contemporary times. 
 
The text of the democratic 1978 Constitution reflected many of the tensions and political 
stumbling blocks that existed at the time of the inter-party discussion on the territorial 
organization of the state. This issue was regarded to be one of the most contentious to agree 
upon in the general consensual climate for democratisation. As a result, a constitutional 
‘open model’ for political decentralization gained support from all major political parties and 
the citizenship at large.1 The subsequent process of home-rule-all-round has aimed at 
providing internal territorial accommodation by combining both federal principles of self-rule 
and, to a lesser degree, shared rule (Elazar, 1987).  
 
The Spanish 1978 Constitution does not include the word “federal” in any of its provisions, 
or in any subsequent legislation. However, since the beginning of the 1980s the dynamics 
of the Estado de las Autonomías (State of Autonomies) are characterized by a latent 
federalization (Moreno, 2001a). Furthermore, the main features of the Spanish covenantal 
process concord with the federative criterion that legitimacy of each autonomous layer of 
government is constitutionally guaranteed (Burgess, 1993). 
 
Spain is composed of 17 Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomous Communities), three of 
which are recognised by the 1978 Constitution as ‘historical nationalities’ (the Basque 
Country, Catalonia and Galicia). In these nationalities, Basque, Catalan and Galician are 
regional languages with full legal status alongside Castilian (or Spanish as is usually refer 
to elsewhere), which is the official language of the whole Kingdom of Spain. Approximately 
a fourth of the Spanish population of 40 million is bilingual.2
 
Nearly 25 years after the approval of the first regional constitutional laws or Statues of 
Autonomy (Basque Country and Catalonia in 1979), the process of decentralization of 
powers has achieved a high degree of popular support largely transcending past patterns 
of internal confrontation.3 In policy terms the process of decentralization has allowed for 
considerable regional autonomy and home rule.  
 
Transferring of powers and services from the central state to the regional state, together 
with fiscal federalism arrangements, have allowed the public budgets of the Comunidades 
Autónomas to grow very considerably. Figures concerning the territorial distribution of 
public expenditure in Spain are illustrative: the regional level increased their share from 3 
per cent of the total Spanish spending in 1981 to as much as 35.5 per cent in 2002 (see 
                                            
1 Conservatives, Centrists, Nationalists, Socialists and Communists were involved in broking a constitutional 
wide inter-party consensus. In the popular referendum held on 6 December 1978, the Spanish Carta Magna 
received 87.9% ‘yes’ votes, 7.8% ‘no’ votes, and 4.3% null or blank votes. Abstention reached 32.9% of the 
registered electorate. 
2 Catalan and its dialects are spoken by 4.2 million in Catalonia; 2.1 in Valencia; 0.2 in the Balearic Islands, 
and 0.05 in Aragon; Basque is the vernacular language of 0.7 million in the Basque Country, and 0.05 in 
Navarre; and Galician is that of 2.3 million gallegos. Other official languages, as declared in their regional 
Statues of Autonomy, are Bable (spoken by 0.4 million in Asturias) and Aranese (0.004 in Catalonia) There 
are also a number of Spanish dialects widely spoken in other regions (Andalusia, Canary Islands, 
Extremadura, Murcia) (Sanmartí Roset, 1997: 67). 
3 In 2002, public assessment of the setting-up of the Comunidades Autónomas was considered ‘positive’ by 
67 per cent as compared to 51 per cent in 1994. Those who had a ‘negative’ opinion decreased from 19 to 
13 per cent, while the same 11 per cent of the surveyed expressed neither ‘positive’ nor ‘negative’ views 
(CIS, 1998, 2002). 
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Table 1). If public spending is to be identified as a good indicator of the level of regional 
autonomy (Watts, 2001), then it should be concluded that the Spanish Comunidades 
Autónomas enjoy a much higher degree of self-government as compared to federated 
units in other formally established federations in the world (e.g. Latin America). 
 
 
Table 1: Territorial Distribution of Public Expenditure in Spain (%) 
 
 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 
CENTRAL 87.3 75.7 72.6 66.2 58.3 58.9 56.2 48.7 
REGIONAL 3.0 12.2 14.6 20.5 25.8 26.9 28.2 35.5 
LOCAL 9.7 12.1 12.8 13.3 15.9 14.2 15.6 15.8 
 
 
Notes: (a) During 1999-2002, strong regional increases corresponded to the decentralization 
of education and health powers to all 17 Comunidades Autónomas. 
 
(b) Spending on social insurance pensions has not been taken into account as it would 
introduce a bias were it to be included as a central government matter. 
 
Source: MAP (1997) for years 1981-90, and MAP (2002) for years 1993-2002. 
 
 
Rather than as a result of a well-defined constitutional separation of competencies and 
powers, federalization in Spain has developed in an inductive manner, step by step. 
Actions by Jacobin centralists encroached in sections of the public administration and in 
some influential Spanish parliamentary parties, together with those of their ‘adversaries’ in 
the minority nationalisms and regional governments (principally, Basque and Catalan) 
have favoured bilateral and ad hoc centre-periphery relationships. For quite different 
reasons both influential political and administrative elites at both central and regional 
spheres have shown reluctance to encourage horizontal and multilateral processes of 
decision-making. As a result, the Estado de las Autonomías has not unfolded explicitly into 
a formal federation or federal-like system of government because of a less-developed 
shared rule in the general governance of the country. Likewise, the persistence of political 
terrorism in the Basque Country has highly conditioned inter-party negotiations for an 
eventual constitutional reform and formal federalization. 
 
Spain can be regarded as a remarkable example of how an exclusivist ethnic order 
(Franco’s dictatorship), modelled after the ideal-type of a Castilian hegemonic Volstaat or 
core-nation (Brubaker, 1996), has evolved into a liberal and plural democracy. Likewise, 
the consensual agreement made explicit in the 1978 Constitution can be interpreted as an 
unwritten pledge to extend the procedures of political dialogue and consociationalism as 
guiding principles for future developments of internal accommodation. 
 
In this chapter a review of historical events is meant to provide background information on 
ethnoterritorial cleavages and politics of territorial accommodation in Spain. It is followed 
by a section devoted to substantiate the claim that the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías 
is a federation in disguise. After identifying features of the model of multiple ethnoterritorial 
concurrence and dual identities in Spain, a discussion is carried out on the relationship 
between federalism, nationalism and consociational arrangements. 
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2. Spain: a historical nation of nations 
 
Despite its secular internal ethnoterritorial conflicts, Spain is an entity clearly identifiable as 
a country of countries, or a nation of nations. This unity goes beyond the simple 
aggregation of territories and peoples with no other affinity than their coexistence under 
the rule of one common monarch or political power. However, the social and cultural 
cohesion that makes up Spain’s unity does not obliterate its internal rivalries. As has 
happened in the past, concurrence among Spanish nationalities and regions has brought 
about an extra cultural incentive for creativity and civilization, but it has also been used as 
an excuse for open confrontation as happened in armed conflicts in modern times (Revolt 
of the Reapers, 1640-52; War of Spanish Succession, 1701-14; Carlist Wars, 1833-40, 
1846-48 and 1872-75; or the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39). 
 
History provides a good deal of arguments for the claiming of regional home rule and the 
decentralization of political power in contemporary Spain. Most minority nationalisms and 
regional movements find in the fertile and complex Spanish history reasons in the 
legitimisation of their quests for autonomy, self-government or independence as early as 
pre-Roman times.4  
 
Spanish majority nationalism has also found in history reasons for programmes of 
centralising nation-building, particularly during the 19th Century. For Spanish liberals the 
task was to articulate an ‘aggregate monarchy’ into an institutionalised nation. For the 
reactionary authoritarians, the Spanish ‘indissoluble’ nation was also to prevail upon 
regional diversities.  
 
Both types of minority and majority nationalisms can be regarded as sharing a common 
legacy and origins (de Riquer and Ucelay-Da Cal, 1994). An examination of Spain’s history 
focussing on its internal relations of power, and on the peculiarities of what became the 
first modern state in Europe at the end of the 15th century, is essential for testing claims 
regarding the debate on federalization and territorial accommodation.  
 
Preliminary, two main structuring factors are to be taken into account when analysing the 
territorial history of Spain. First, the dichotomy between particularism and universalism, 
which was gradually forged in Spain’s Middle Ages during the eight-century period of 
Reconquista, or Christian recovery of the lands of the ancient Roman Hispania from 
Muslim control (718-1492). Such a relationship highly conditioned the medieval 
aggregation of the various territories of the Iberian Peninsula. Since then, the particular 
and the general have determined most aspirations, expectations and frustrations in the 
process of internal accommodation of Spain. 
 
Second, the case of Spain is to be categorised as a union-state,5 rather than a nation-
state (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983). Early state-formation developed in a peculiar manner 
allowing varying degrees of autonomy of their constituent parts, which were incorporated 
by means of treaty and pact. While crown legitimacy prevailed state-wide, the union 
                                            
4 The influential Catalan nationalist Enric Prat de la Riba described how in the VI century BC, Phoenician 
explorers found the Iberian etnos covering from Murcia (in the south-east of the Iberian Peninsula) to the 
river Rhone in France. This was “[...] the first link [...] in the chain of generations that have forged the Catalan 
soul” (Prat de la Riba, 1917: 99-102). 
5 The United Kingdom could also be included in such a category. Let us remind that after the Union of the 
Crows (1603), and the Act of Union (1707), Scotland’s civil society continued to enjoy a degree of autonomy 
in crucial areas such as education, law, local government and religion (Paterson, 1994). 
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structure entailed internal variations regarding pre-union arrangements and rights. Such 
configurations conditioned subsequent programmes of nation-building in modern and 
contemporary times. 
 
2.1. Medieval kingdoms, dynastic union and Bourbon homogenisation 
 
After the annihilation of the last Iberian stronghold in Spain (Numancia, 133 BC), the 
Roman presence in Hispania lasted five and a half centuries. During this period political 
unity was moulded by the action of this ‘external’ force. Later on, the barbarian invasions 
opened up a new process of political unification, strengthened by the occupying Visigoths 
from AD 540 onwards. These occupiers converted into fervent Christians. For the second 
time in Hispanic history, and owing to the political action of a foreign lineage, a political 
bonding of the Iberian peoples was forged, enabling them to live under the same god, 
king, and common laws.6
 
For most of the eight centuries of the Reconquista, certain parts of the Peninsula acquired 
distinct forms of social organization. Some had diffuse political origins and, at the same 
time, became themselves the origins of the entities that evolved into a good number of 
today's regions and nationalities. They shared a common mission, as Christians, to defeat 
the Moors, to which end they established and dissolved numerous alliances. However, it 
was not only a struggle between Muslims and Christians. There were numerous treaties, 
interchanges, intrigues and, even cases of ‘good neighbourliness’.7 In this manner, in a 
country which was then a fertile mix of civilization for the Christian, Muslim and Jewish 
civilizations, the future significance of pacts as structural precursors of modern Spain8 was 
established. 
 
In the period between the seventh and twelfth centuries, geography was a decisive factor 
in the political fragmentation9 of the Reconquista. In Christian Spain, a number of 
kingdoms claimed to be the political heirs of Visigoth Spain, but their actions resulted in 
the constitution of peninsular ‘sub-kingdoms’, or autonomous dominions, such as those of 
Asturias (739), Leon (866), Navarre (905), Catalonia (987), Aragon (1035), Castile (1037) 
and Galicia (1065), or that of Portugal in 1139, year of the ascension of Alphonse I to the 
throne of Portugal, a would-be kingdom that refused to remained as a mere earldom 
pertaining to the Crown of Castile. For its part, after the dissolution of Cordoba's Caliphate, 
                                            
6 King Chindasvinto (r. 642-9) and his son Recesvinto (r. 649-72) were able to collate the Visigothic laws in 
the Liber iudiciorum or Lex Wisigothorum, which became applicable to the whole of the peninsular territory. 
7 Throughout the medieval period, and parallel to the tendency towards warring and expansionism, the habit 
of making pacts with and respecting the rights of the defeated, whose cultural and technical knowledge was 
generally superior to that of the victors, was consolidated. Thus, with the growth of the Christian kingdoms, 
the ‘re-conquered’ communities (Mozarab, Mudejar and Jewish) obtained legal statutes, or fueros, that 
protected the integrity of their customs and ways of life (Moreno, 2001a).  
8 According to historian Américo Castro, "..In the year 1000…Christian Spain was essentially what it would 
be in 1600, and could be clearly distinguished from France and Italy." (Castro, 1984: 13). 
9 While the Northeast of Spain structured around the values of Christianity and the figure of St. James, and 
the Castilians rebelled against the old kingdom of Leon-Asturias, Catalonia remained part of the Carolingian 
Empire since 987 as the ‘Hispanic Landmark’ (Marca Hispánica). Catalan nationalists, including Jordi Pujol 
himself, have identified the Caroligian Frankish origins of the Comtats founded by Charlemagne as the 
origins of Catalonia, and as such different from the rest of the Spanish lands. According to Américo Castro, 
“Catalonia neither belonged completely to Spain, nor ceased to be part of it” (ibid.: 81). 
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Moorish Spain broke down into taifa kingdoms, resulting in an intensification of both 
alliances and confrontations between Christians and Muslims.10
 
The lands belonging to the Crown of Aragon, led and guided by Catalonia and its capital, 
Barcelona, had full self-governing institutions and experienced an enormous economic 
growth during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The area of influence of the 
Aragonese-Catalan-Valencia Confederation stretched to the French Languedoc and 
Provence, Naples, Southern Italy and Sicily, Athens, Neopatria and numerous 
Mediterranean enclaves. 
 
At the same time, the ambition of the Castilian princes, through conquests and royal 
marriages, brought about the unification of Leon and Castile (1230), as well as the 
incorporation of the Basque provinces of Gipuzkoa (1200), Araba (1332) and Biscay 
(1379) 11, and the Canary Islands.12 In the Compromiso de Caspe (1412) representatives 
of the Aragonese, Catalan and Valencian parliaments agreed to elect Ferdinand I of 
Antequera (r. 1412-1416) as heir to the Crown of Aragon. This event was to become the 
origin of the marriage between Ferdinand of Aragon, grandson of Ferdinand I, and Isabella 
of Castile, the future Catholic Kings.  
 
Modern political unification in Spain took place by means of the dynastic union under the 
Catholic Kings in 1469, year of the marriage of the future heirs to the Kingdom of Castile 
and the Crown of Aragon. In 1474 and 1479, the Catholic Kings took effective possession 
of the thrones of Castile and Aragon, respectively. As it was not the result of a unitary 
process of territorial amalgamation, the Spanish constituent territories (crowns, kingdoms, 
principalities, dominions) maintained much of their former institutional existence. The 
incorporation of such territories to the Hispanic monarchy was achieved at an early stage 
of the European Modern Age. 
 
The Kingdom of Spain became an imperial power in the sixteenth century. It was feared 
for its expansionism and extended its influence throughout the five continents, while 
consolidating its own empire in Europe through a peculiar form of obedience to the King of 
Spain. The monarchs of the House of Habsburg favoured the formula of both political unity 
and territorial autonomy, and in general they maintained this attitude throughout their 
entire dynasty (1517-1700). The precedents for these were the political pacts of the 
Aragonese-Catalan-Valencian Confederation, adopted also by the Austrian branch of the 
same dynasty. "The universalistic imperial aspirations that Spain and the House of 
Habsburg represented ... rested entirely on local autonomy and inclined towards federative 
combinations" (Hintze, 1975: 99). 
 
Imperial development in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries focussed on affairs 
beyond the frontiers of the Iberian Peninsula. The Habsburg Kings did not seek to unite 
                                            
10 For historians such as Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz and Angus MacKay, during the long medieval period, 
and in contrast to the rest of Europe, the concepts of border and re-conquest became essential symbolic and 
actual referents in the historical development of the country. Later they would be replaced by the enterprise 
of the Spanish Empire and the expansion overseas (Sánchez-Albornoz, 1956; MacKay, 1977) 
11 For Salvador de Madariaga (1979) the three Basque provinces were not constituent of the Basque 
Country; which was a modern political creation. In any case, all three provinces took good care of their 
fueros or local rights, before and after they joined the Castilian Crown: “They would not recognized Lord or 
King without the prior and solemn pledge for honouring their fueros” (Pi i Margall, 1911: 251). 
12 In 1436, and after a lengthy dispute with the Kingdom of Portugal, Castile obtained the recognition of its 
sovereignty over the Canary Islands from Pope Eugene IV. 
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Spain by homogenizing the cultures, laws, and customs of its lands. Attempts by courtiers 
and royal favourites in Madrid to assimilate the peoples of Spain, provoked the Catalan 
Reapers' Revolt and the independence of Portugal (1640).13
 
When the Bourbon dynasty took the Spanish throne, a long period of mirrored responses 
to the processes of national homogenisation carried out in neighbouring France began. 
Philip V, grandson of French King Louis XIV, abolished the Catalan fueros in 1714 after 
the Spanish War of Succession (1701-14). During the eighteenth century, and aiming to 
reflect the French absolutist model of state monarchy, the leading figures of the Spanish 
Despotic Enlightenment advocated the building of a Spanish nation above and beyond the 
internal boundaries of kingdoms, principalities and lordly estates (Domínguez Ortiz, 1976). 
The process was attempted to different degrees of success in other old European states, 
such as France's ‘gallicization’ and Britain's ‘anglicization’ of most of its territory. In any 
case, the ‘Spanish mosaic’ persisted formally throughout the Old Regime (seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries). The writer José Cadalso described such diversity in his 
celebrated Cartas Marruecas (Moroccan Letters): 
 
“[...] an Andalusian has nothing in common with a Biscayan, a Catalan is totally different 
from a Galician; much the same happens between the inhabitants o Valencia and 
Cantabria. This Peninsula, divided during so many centuries into various kingdoms, has 
always displayed a variety of costumes, laws, languages and currencies” (Cadalso, 1978: 
85). 
 
2.2. Nation-building, weak liberalism and political modernization  
 
Napoleonic Spain aimed to amalgamate despotism, enlightened or not, with the 
centralizing ideals of the French Revolution. The popular rising of 1808 against the 
Napoleonic occupation was a general affair all over Spain. With the War of Independence -
-or Peninsular War-- Spain reaffirmed its cohesion as a national state in an emergency 
situation. Paradoxically, the popular uprisings to expel the foreign troops were led in many 
cases by the very advocates of the French enlightened programmes seeking cultural 
standardization. 
 
The War of Independence was an historical landmark whose resolution, broadly speaking, 
would determine the peculiar processes of nation-building and modernization in Spain, not 
only in the nineteenth century, but also in most of the twentieth century. During the conflict 
with the French (1808-14), the diverse territories of the Spanish Peninsula fought 
separately but united in a common aim to free themselves from those who illegitimately 
occupied their land. 
 
The co-ordination between the various regional executives constituted a de facto federal-
like government.14 Politically, this was the most significant fact to contribute to the defeat 
                                            
13 In a confidential memorandum of 25 December 1620, the Duke of Olivares, who governed Spain for 22 
years, advised Philip IV to become King of Spain, and not to remain content with being King of Portugal, 
Aragon, Valencia, and Count of Barcelona: "You should see to it that these kingdoms of which Spain is 
composed are ruled by the laws and in the manner of Castile. In doing so, your Majesty would become the 
world's most powerful sovereign" (reproduced in J. Linz, 1973: 43). The attempt resulted in the eventual 
banishment of the Duke in 1643, and Catalonia's loss of Roussillon, Conflent and Cerdanya. The Catalan 
national anthem, Els Segadors ("The Reapers") evokes the events of 1640. 
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of the Napoleonic troops. However, the liberal Constitution of Cadiz (1812) designed a 
centralizing unitary state much unlike other liberal models of territorial organization, as was 
that of the North American federative experience. 
 
The liberales wanted to build the Spanish nation by applying a unifying programme in a 
country half-way towards bourgeois modernization. They imitated the hyper-centralist 
practices and strategies of their French counterparts, but were incapable of consolidating 
both their political reforms and their ‘national revolution’. Such incapacity was due not only 
to the conflict with the forces of pre-modernity, but also to their own political contradictions. 
Most notable among these was the individualism and party factionalism they practised, 
which quite clearly contradicted the general conception of Spain they claimed to embrace. 
 
Many territories of Spain, particularly those with a strong historical identity and a tradition 
of self-government, perceived liberal centralism as unnatural and stifling. Especially in 
Navarre, the Basque provinces and Catalonia there were protests at centralist reform and 
claims were renewed for the restitution of their ancient fueros or local rights. The 
circumstances of the time ensured that the Carlists15 and those reactionaries who 
supported the ancien régime were able to benefit from the peripheral hostility towards 
liberal elites in Madrid. 
 
All things considered, the liberal national-building and political modernization in Spain 
during the nineteenth century achieved some of the intended goals. Formal education 
extended throughout the country. The use of the Spanish language (Castilian) generalized. 
The internal market also consolidated, together with a centralized bureaucracy, a 
homogenisation of the juridical life, and the accomplishment of a national network of 
communication and transport. However, the problems for the internal territorial 
accommodation would remain for the years to come. As a matter of fact, the struggle 
against centralism can be considered as the single most constant factor in Spain during 
the nineteenth century. 
 
An episode towards the end of the period heralded by the Glorious Revolution (1868) is 
especially relevant to single out: the experience of the First (Federal) Republic of 1873 and 
the phenomenon of cantonalism. In general terms, the republicans were federalists. After 
the 1873 elections, the Constituent Assemblies ratified solemnly the Federal Republic as 
the form of state. In a chaotic political climate, caused by the weakness of Parliament and 
the central institutions, the feverish activity of those supporting a canton-made federation 
emerged from the periphery. This untimely attempt to form a ‘bottom-up’ Spanish 
federation was carried out in a moment of considerable tension internally and abroad.  
 
The cantonalista experience caused alarm because of its centrifugal character and its 
potential for creating uncertainty. Again, force was used: the military coup of Generals 
Pavía and Martínez Campos ‘simplified’ the political situation. With the Restoration of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 The territories elected two representatives to the Junta Central, supreme unit of governance in occupied 
Spain. Besides those functions of general action (co-ordination of war activities, colonial and foreign 
relations, and general services), the rest of the administrative affairs were run at the regional level. 
15 Traditionalist Catholic supporters of the pretender Charles who claimed the Spanish throne after the death 
of his brother, King Ferdinand VII. The Carlist movement proclaimed a virulent anti-liberalism, fuelled by a 
frantic fear of secularisation, rationalism and modernity. In the 19thh century, three Carlist civil wars ripped 
Spain apart: 1833-40, 1846-48, and 1872-75. The current Basque separatist movement (ETA, HB, KAS, EH) 
is characterized by an emotional and messianic style which is not so far removed from the Carlist 
traditionalism which preceded it, and which it has now to a large extent replaced (Giner and Moreno, 1990).  
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Bourbon monarchy (1876-1923), and the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-30) which 
ensued, a new centrally-led attempt to impose uniformity on the country manifested itself. 
This process ended once again in failure. 
 
The establishment of universal male suffrage in 1890 had the notable effect of placing 
incipient Catalan nationalism, or Catalanisme, squarely in the Spanish political scene. The 
disparity between Catalonia’s social structure and that of an impoverished rural Spain was 
an important factor in the rise of Catalan nationalism (Giner, 1980). Differences in socio-
economic composition between Spain's two major cities, Madrid and Barcelona, also 
became increasingly evident.16 These elements fuelled a sense of hopelessness amongst 
members of the Catalan elites, who put their electoral support behind home-rule parties. 
The most important was the Lliga Catalana (later known as the Lliga Regionalista) which 
was founded in 1901 and subsequently came to enjoy significant influence under the 
leadership of Francesc Cambó. 
 
The Basque Nationalist Party, founded by Sabino de Arana Goiri in 1895, was less 
successful than the Catalanist Lliga in obtaining support across class lines, partly because 
of its religious emphasis and ethnocentric claims. Early Basque nationalism stressed 
traditional community values in opposition to bourgeois industrial society, the effects of 
which included a considerable influx of migrants from the rest of Spain into the Basque 
Country. A racially-based Basque essentialism was the ideological foundation of early 
Basque nationalism, which combined with a powerful populism and religious exclusivism to 
produce a discourse quite distinct from that of Catalan nationalism. The latter ideology was 
more intellectual and less based on 'folklore' from the outset, and has always been less 
secessionist in character.  
 
Catalan nationalism seems to have provoked greater resistance by the Spanish central 
elites than Basque nationalism precisely because it offered an alternative view of Spain, 
something which Basque nationalism more frequently turned its back on. Both 
nationalisms, however, could be seen as political manifestations of a vigorous and 
prosperous periphery, which contrasted sharply with the often inept and parasitical 
centralism of the Spanish state to which it was subordinated. 
 
Regionalism came in different forms in other Spanish territories, reflecting the 
ethnoterritorial diversity of a plural Spain and, in many cases, inspired by the action of the 
Catalan and Basque movements. Partly as a consequence of the federal experience of the 
First Republic (1873), there were clamours for recognition in Galicia, Valencia, Andalusia, 
and Asturias. Chronologically, the appearance of explicit claims for regional autonomy in 
contemporary Spanish politics occurred in the years just before and after the beginning of 
the twentieth century. 
 
A widespread distrust and hostility against the central government fuelled regional 
sentiments. Not only peasants, day-labourers and unskilled workers, but also members of 
the middle classes and significant sections of the intellectual elites had a perception of 
state institutions as alien, remote and brutal. Perceptions and sentiments toward the 
Spanish state were also favourable depending on social class and place of residence 
                                            
16 Between 1877 and 1920, the proportion of Madrid workers in the industrial sector grew considerably from 
18.4 to 42.5% of the workforce, but remained behind Barcelona in this respect, with 37.1% in 1877 to 54% in 
1920. Perhaps it was more significant that the proportion of ‘unproductive’ middle classes in Madrid, 
consisting of civil servants, members of the Armed Forces and domestic staff (23.6% in 1877 and 15.3% in 
1920), was greater than that of Barcelona (5.9% in 1877 and 5% in 1920). (Data taken from Linz 1967: 209). 
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within Spain. For instance, inhabitants of large areas of Castile and Andalusia, an even of 
a ‘historical nationality’ such as Galicia, regarded state institutions as the main source of 
life opportunities and eventually adopted a strong Spanish identity. This would translate 
into a centralist and homogenising understanding of Spain’s social reality. As a 
consequence, administrative, juridical, military and political officers became increasingly 
reluctant on the idea of Spanish plurality, something, which would have far-reaching 
effects in subsequent civil and political conflicts, as in the Civil War (1936-39). 
 
2.3. The Second Republic, the Franco dictatorship and the 1978 Constitution 
 
In spite of its short existence, the Second Republic (1931-9) contributed greatly to the 
resolution of ethnoterritorial conflict in Spain. The most notable improvement was the 
constitutional design of the state as a regional model, situated somewhere between a 
unitary and a federal state. This led to statutes of autonomy for Catalonia17, the Basque 
Country18 and Galicia19. However, the regional autonomy question also played a 
fundamental part in the political polarisation leading up to the Civil War (1936-9). Even 
within the Republican forces the issue of regional autonomy created no little turmoil. 
 
Although the autonomist movement was still young, it was spreading throughout Spain by 
the time the Civil War broke out (18 July, 1936). With the victory of General Franco's 
forces (1 April, 1939), a long period of political decentralization ensued, aiming once again 
to build a uniform national Spain. 
 
Two of the great obsessions of the Franco dictatorship (1939-75) were anti-communism 
and anti-separatism. The ‘sacred unity of the homeland’ was regarded as an indispensable 
unifying element and as the very raison d'être of General Franco's despotic regime. To a 
large extent, Francoism justified itself through its ability to suppress and extirpate all forms 
of home rule,20 regionalism and sub-state nationalism. In the end, the Franco dictatorship 
provoked the opposite effect to such centralist state moulding: 
 
"Even under the most extreme totalitarian circumstances such a task (e.g. Spanish 
‘national’ homogenisation and cultural assimilation) cannot be easily accomplished. One 
consequence of attempts to erode communal identities and national traits can be their 
intensification" (Giner, 1984: 87). 
                                            
17 On April 14th 1931 the Spanish Second Republic was proclaimed. On the same day the Catalan 
nationalist leader, Francesc Macià, declared the creation of the Republic of Catalonia within the framework 
of a Spanish Confederation. After negotiations with representatives of the central government, the 
Generalitat, Catalonia’s government of medieval origin, was re-established. 
18 Three days after the proclamation of the Second Republic, an assembly of Basque mayors gathered by 
José Antonio Aguirre, leader of the Basque Nationalist Party, claimed their right to autonomy within a 
Spanish federal republic. At the end of 1933, the statutory project did not include Navarre and was supported 
in a referendum by 47 per cent in Araba (Alava), and almost 90 per cent of Biscayans and Gipuzkoans. The 
proposal was put forward in the Spanish Parliament in December of 1933. Finally on 1 October 1936, the 
Basque statute of autonomy was passed, with similar rights and powers to that of Catalonia. 
19 In Galicia, the Organización Regional Gallega Autónoma (O.R.G.A., Autonomous Regional Organisation 
of Galicia), led by Santiago Casares Quiroga, had instigated the drafting of a proposal for autonomy. On 
June 28th 1936, a referendum was held and around 70% of the Galician electorate voted. The final result 
was 991,476 votes for and 6,805 against.
20 With the partial exception of Araba (Alava) and Navarre. These two foral territories were able to keep their 
fiscal privileges as a ‘reward’ for the participation of many Carlist from those provinces who joined Franco’s 
forces during the Civil War (Giner and Moreno, 1990). 
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From the 1960s onward, demands for regional autonomy became significantly more 
intense. During the final years of Franco’s regime, the opposition forces developed a 
programme claiming both democratic rights and political decentralization. In the ‘historical 
nationalities’ (Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia), the opposition forces were able to 
articulate a political discourse denouncing the absence of democracy and the continuous 
official attacks on their identities. In these communities, democratic and ethnoterritorial 
claims became inseparable. In this way the ideology of self-government and political 
decentralization made its way into Spanish contemporary democratic consciousness. 
 
After Franco's death in 1975, the transitional process to democracy began in earnest. 
There was general agreement among the democratic parties that decentralization was 
essential. However, the specific model to be adopted was unclear. In the end, the broad 
political consensus which made the drafting of the 1978 Constitution possible also brought 
with it an element of ambiguity in the territorial organisation of Spain. In fact, two different 
conceptions, which had traditionally confronted each other, were given expression in the 
Spanish 1978 Constitution: on the one hand, the idea of an indivisible Spanish nation-
state, and on the other, the notion that plural Spain was an ensemble of diverse peoples, 
historic nationalities and regions. 
 
3. Estado de las Autonomías: a federation in disguise? 
 
The expression Estado de las Autonomías has became popular in Spain in the daily use 
not only of politicians, lawyers and media, but also of the citizenship at large. Experts on 
studies of nationalism and decentralization of power have also coined such an expression 
outside Spain. Indeed, the contribution of the formula autonómica to the theoretical debate 
on the territorial organization of contemporary democracies has been significant. Its 
closely conceptual link with federalism is, notwithstanding, undeniable.  
 
The federalizing nature implicit in the internal logic of the Estado de las Autonomías 
corresponds with the federal texture of Spanish society. However, there is no general 
agreement on whether Spain should be considered properly as a federal system or a 
federation. As pointed out earlier, the word “federal” is neither included in any of the 
provisions of the 1978 Constitution nor in the subsequent constitutional legislation passed 
by the Spanish Parliament. From this terminological perspective there should be no further 
discussion. However, beyond the constraints of the formal terminology the political 
articulation of ideas, interests and institutions in Spain need to be reassessed.  
 
Together with de jure considerations there exist important de facto arrangements that lend 
support to the arguable inclusion of Spain in the category of federations. In order to 
substantiate such claims some basic federalising criteria is to be contrasted as follows: 
 
(a) Spain’s ‘autonomical’ system combines both ‘self rule’ and ‘shared rule’. 
 
(b) Spain is a democracy where two tiers of government --central and regional-- enjoy 
constitutionally separate powers and representative parliamentary institutions.  
 
(c) Spanish Constitution is the legitimacy source for the right of self-government by the 
Comunidades Autónomas. The authority of the regional layer is not a surrogate of the 
central government. 
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(d) Spain is composed of 17 Comunidades Autónomas, each and everyone having 
democratic constitutional statutes of autonomy for their internal organisation.  
 
(e) Spain’s Constitutional Court is the ultimate arbitrator for the demarcation of concurrent 
powers and governmental competencies. 21  
 
(f) Spanish Parliament is bicameral with a Senate envisaged as a ‘territorial upper 
chamber’. 
 
No ideal-type of federation has been put into effect which could serve as a reference 
model to measure the federative qualities of the federal-like systems existing in the world 
today. Spain could well be considered as a multi-national federation in disguise where the 
development of the joint action between the two main governmental tiers (central and 
regional) needs further consolidation. At the beginning of the process of decentralisation, 
powers were allocated with no little intergovernmental friction. Later on, challenges to laws, 
decree laws and legislative decrees, either by the Spanish or the regional parliaments, have 
been judged by the Constitutional Court in a manner that confirms the federalizing trend 
toward the ‘sharing of rule’ between central and regional levels (Agranoff and Ramos 
Gallarín, 1997).  
 
However, Spain would not fully qualify as a federation if we take into account the functional 
shortcomings in the actual institutionalisation of the ‘shared rule’ principle. Despite its 
constitutional definition as ‘territorial chamber’, the Spanish Upper House mainly performs 
duplicating functions with regard to the fully-fledged Chamber of Deputies, or Lower 
House. Since 1978 the Senate has merely doubled the legislative functions of the Congress 
of Deputies. Its value has been basically instrumental, offering the parties of government and 
opposition a second chance to agree on legislative projects or to introduce amendments 
where legislative readings in the Lower House were hurried or superficial. This has 
contributed to its poor political reputation and to its low estimation among the citizenship with 
respect to its place and function. 
 
If the institutional involvement of the Autonomous Communities in state-wide decision-
making via the Senate has been very limited, intergovernmental relations by means of the so-
called ‘sectoral conferences’ (conferencias sectoriales) have contributed to horizontal 
consultation despite that they are not institutions for joint decision-making. Exchange of 
information is an important element facilitated at the sectoral conferences, which have 
become mechanisms of ‘institutional courtesy’ (Grau i Creus, 2000), and which reflect to a 
certain degree a trend towards practices of co-operative federalism (Börzel, 2000).  
 
Intergovernmental relations are still very dependent on the colouring of the political party in 
charge of the different levels of governments. Consequently, most of the conflicts are 
political-contingent rather than policy-oriented. That is why ‘bilateralism’ is still the preferred 
manner to reach political agreements rather than the multilateral institutionalization of ‘shared 
rule’ in a genuine federal Senate. Power-sharing at the federal level is a crucial feature of 
federations which is not institutionalised in the case of Spain. With the proviso of the 
                                            
21 The need for a pact between government and opposition in the Spanish Parliament for the election of the 
members of the Tribunal Constitucional has so far proved to be a barrier against open political sectarianism 
in the appointment of its members. Furthermore, the important sentence of the Constitutional Court (5 
August, 1983) on the LOAPA Act (‘Organic Law on the Harmonization of the Autonomy Process’) passed by 
the Spanish Parliament, reinforced the open and federalizing interpretation of the 1978 Constitution very 
much against the views of centralist leaders within centre-right UCD and centre-left PSOE main parties.  
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dysfunctional existence of the Upper House as chamber of territorial representation of the 
citizens of the Comunidades Autónomas, Spain’s Estado de las Autonomías satisfies 
nevertheless the other crucial federative criteria above reviewed.  
 
3.1. Multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence and dual identities 
 
The gradual establishment of the Estado de las Autonomías in Spain has generated a 
complex of relations which can be explained as multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence 
(Moreno, 1995). ‘Concurrence’ should be understood in this context as the simultaneous 
occurrence of political transactions at state and sub-state levels, within the framework of a 
multi-national state. The term should not simply be made equal to ethnoterritorial 
‘competition’. In a situation of ethnoterritorial concurrence there are competitive actions 
between majority and minority nationalisms and regionalisms, o between the latter. However, 
there is no compulsion per se to eliminate concurrent actors.  
 
The Spanish mode of multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence involves, in the first place, two 
‘'axioms', which refer to general features that are common to most of the contemporary 
world’s decentralised and federal systems: (a) conflicting intergovernmental relations, and (b) 
the politicisation of ethnoterritorial institutions. Secondly, two ‘premises’’ relate to the stage 
prior to unfolding of Spain’s process of decentralization: (c) the differential fact, or political 
‘distinctiveness’ claimed by the minority nations within Spain, and (d) the centralist inertia, or 
path dependent assumption by the central administration of being hierarchically ‘superior’. 
Thirdly, three 'principles' are the fundamental pillars upon which the territorial rationale of the 
1978 Constitution rests upon, explicitly or implicitly: (e) the democratic decentralization, by 
which liberal democracy and territorial autonomy are intimately related (f) the comparative 
grievance, in order to vindicate powers and competencies among the Comunidades 
Autónomas, and (g) the inter-territorial solidarity, so that basic levels of wealth are similar 
throughout Spain. Lastly, three 'rules' are the most compelling elements in the social and 
political structuring of the future development of federalization in Spain: (h) the centrifugal 
pressure, put on the centre by regional parties or elites (I) the ethnoterritorial mimesis, or the 
practices of policy equalisation among the Comunidades Autónomas as none wants to be 
‘left behind’, and (j) the inductive allocation of powers, a consequence of the a gradual top-
down process of decentralization. These elements are responsible for the asymmetry, 
heterogeneity and plurality which embody the Estado de las Autonomías (Moreno, 2001b). 
 
The case of Spain shows the lack of one single and all-embracing national state identity 
extended throughout the country. Spain’s multiple ethnoterritorial identities expressed in 
the 17 Comunidades Autónomas illustrates how nationalism and federalism can ‘work’ 
together. The concept of dual identity or compound nationality concerns the way in which 
citizens identify themselves in sub-state nations or regions. It incorporates in variable 
proportions the regional (ethnoterritorial) identity and the national (state) identity. As a 
result of this, citizens share their institutional loyalties at both levels of political legitimacy 
without any apparent fracture between them.22
                                            
22 The question put to them in successive surveys has been as follows: “In general, would you say that you 
feel...1. Only Basque, Catalan, Galicia, etc.; 2. More Basque, Catalan, Galician, etc., than Spanish; 3. As 
much Basque, Catalan, Galician, etc. as Spanish; 4. More Spanish than Basque, Catalan, Galician, etc.; 5. 
Only Spanish; 6. Don’t know; 7. No answer”. In the period October 1990-June 1995 a degree of duality was 
expressed by around 70 per cent of the total Spanish population (i.e. categories 2, 3 and 4). Approximately 
30 per cent of all Spaniards expressed a single identity (‘Only Spanish’, or ‘Only Andalusian, Basque, 
Catalan, etc.’) According to 2002 data, percentages were 78 and 22 per cent, respectively (CIS, 2002). For 
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Both multiple ethnoterritorial loyalties and degrees of self-government are in accordance with 
the variable manifestation of such citizens’ dual identification: the more the primordial 
regional (ethnoterritorial) identity prevails upon modern state identity, the higher the demands 
for political autonomy. Conversely, the more developed the national (state) identity is, the 
less likely it would be for ethnoterritorial conflicts to arise. Complete absence of one of the 
two elements of dual identity would lead to a deep socio-political division. If this was the case, 
demands for self-government would probably take the form of a claim for outright sovereignty 
and independence. In other words, when citizens in a sub-state community identify 
themselves in an exclusive manner, the institutional outcome of such antagonism will also 
tend to be exclusive. 
 
Not surprisingly, in the Basque Country single exclusive regional identity is higher than 20 
per cent and highest among all Comunidades Autónomas (26.8 per cent in the period 
1990-95). Note, however, that in a survey immediately carried out before the 2001 Basque 
Elections, those who declared to feel ‘only Basque’ were 23 per cent of the total as 
compared to 41 per cent who identified themselves “as Basque as Spanish”.23 These 
figures may help to put into perspective the statement made by the Lehendakari 
(President) of the Basque Government before the Basque Parliament on 27 September, 
2002. He then proposed a new Pact for Cohabitation (Pacto para la Convivencia) to be 
based on the free association and co-sovereignty between the Basque Country and Spain, 
according to a confederation-like proposal which falls short of independence or 
secession.24
 
Multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence and dual identity are distinctive features of Spain’s 
latent federalization, but can also be found in other democratic federations. Both elements 
provide the legitimising bases for making unity and diversity workable. Polyarchies do not 
necessarily have as compelling alternatives those of secessionism and assimilationism. 
Rather than a stepping-stone towards territorial dissolution, federalism and ethnoterritorial 
accommodation can consolidate liberal democracy in multi-national states (Linz, 1997). 
 
3.2. Castilian Staatsvolk and consociational accommodation 
 
In plural Spain both nationalism and federalism can be regarded as two conceptual sides 
of the same political coin for the achievement of territorial accommodation. No federal-like 
arrangements would have been working out in the process of transition to democracy had 
it not been for the political need to accommodate both Spanish national and minority 
nationalisms alongside other regional claims for territorial home rule. Spain validates, in 
this respect, the claim that federal systems can make compatible internal national 
oppositions and dual identities. 
                                                                                                                                                 
an analysis of the Catalan case, see Moreno, Arriba y Serrano (1998). In Scotland/United Kingdom surveys 
using this identity scale were first carried out in the mid-1980s (Moreno, 1986). 
23 The aggregate percentages of those with a degree of dual identity were 61% as compared to 28% of those 
declaring a single or exclusive self-identification (i.e. “Only Basque” or “Only Spanish”). Note that among 
supporters of the most voted nationalist party in the Basque Country (PNV), a third declared to be “Only 
Basque”, the same amount of those who identify themselves “As Basque as Spanish” (El País, May 7, 
2001). 
24 According to the Lehendakari , the citizens of the Basque Country are entitled to self-determination and to 
decide in a popular referendum the future of its political status and the sharing of its sovereignty within a 
multi-national Spain. Note that full independence is supported by a quarter of the Basque surveyed 
population. 
 14
 
On exploring the relationship between federalism and nationalism, particularly in the case 
of multi-national federations, it has been advanced that “a stable democratic majoritarian 
federation, federal or multi-national, must have a Staatsvolk, a national or ethnic people, 
who are demographically and electorally dominant --though not necessarily an absolute 
majority of the population-- and who will be the co-founders of the federation” (O’Leary, 
2001: 244-5). This claim is meant to be consistent with liberal nationalism (Tamir, 1993), 
national federalism (Forsyth, 1989), and national cultural homogeneity (Gellner, 1997).  
 
Spain provides a good example of how Staatsvolk dynamics are to be cautiously analysed 
on processes of federation-building. As pointed out earlier, dictatorial Francoism attempted 
an identification of an ‘eternal Spain’ as the ideological expression of an old and unpolluted 
‘Castilian spirit’ with a universal language and ideals beyond the limits of time and space. 
Epitomes like the ‘God’s Empire’ (El Imperio hacia Dios) or ‘Spain, a unit of destiny in the 
universal (España, una unidad de destino en lo universal), and a simulated ‘timeless’ 
Castilian culture pertaining to the whole of Spain were used in an attempt to assimilate the 
Spanish mosaic of cultures and peoples.  
 
According to the views of such majority (ethnic) nationalism, Spain was a single nation 
rather than a plural nation of nations. Francoism attempted to enforce a programme of 
‘national’ homogenisation patterned along the lines of a Castilian Staatsvolk, which was 
bound to fail with the return of democracy. By having made the Spanish nation equal to an 
ideal-type of uniform Castile, democrats all around Spain came to face an insuperable 
dilemma between civil liberties and decentralization, or between cultural homogeneity and 
representative government. 
 
The subsequent development of the Estado de las Autonomías has clearly shown the 
fallacy of regarding Castile as a national unit. As a matter of fact only from the ethno-
lingual point of view such a nationality could be taken into account (64% per cent of the 
total population reside in Castilian-speaking territories such as Andalusia, Aragon, Canary 
Islands, Cantabria, Asturias, Extremadura, La Rioja, Madrid or Murcia, together with the 
traditional ‘old’ and ‘new’ Castilles).  
 
However important language is for social mobilization and nation-building, it would be 
unlikely for an ethnic community to be politicised solely around it. At this point, identity 
could well be the necessary extra element providing national cohesion on collective 
perceptions, interpretations and aspirations. But as we have previously examined, the 
wide existence of dual identities in the Castilian-speaking Comunidades Autónomas 
makes implausible an identity attachment to an ideal Castilla which does not exist as such, 
either ethnically or politically. 
 
Could it be hypothesized, nevertheless, that all mono-lingual Castilian-speaking regions in 
Spain would be willing to constitute one political community congruent with their ethno-
lingual commonality in the foreseeable future? ‘No’ ought to be the answer to this question 
if we bear in mind the effects produced by the federalizing developments accomplished in 
the last decades. Processes of socialisation in the consolidation of the Estado de las 
Autonomías have reinforced regional boundary-building and ethnoterritorial diversities. 
Citizens in, say, Aragon or Andalusia regard themselves ethnically much less as Castilian 
speakers than as active members of their own regional communities. The role of the 
meso-governments of the 17 Comunidades Autónomas in the production and re-
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production of regional identities in Spain has been very important (Martínez-Herrera, 
2002). 
 
From the viewpoint of the Basque, Catalan and Galician minority nationalisms, Spain 
ought to be constitutionally composed according to linguistic lines. This approach lends 
support indirectly to the idea of recreating the Castilian Staatsvolk. Not surprisingly, such 
sub-state nationalisms are generally more favourable of establishing confederal options for 
territorial accommodation in Spain than of working-out federal arrangements tout court. 
They are suspicious of versions of one-nation federalism as in the cases of Australia, 
Germany or the USA. Along these lines, Jordi Pujol declared himself a federalist prior to 
his election as President of the Catalan Generalitat in 1980:  
 
"In the specific case of Spain I could conceivably be a federalist, if the federation was 
based on genuine and authentic nationalities of the state, viz. Euskadi [Basque Country], 
Galicia, the whole of Castile, and the Catalan Countries (or just Catalonia, if Valencia and 
the Islands ... rejected being associated with the Principate [Catalonia])". (Pujol, 1980: 26). 
 
After 25 years of widespread decentralisation and latent federalisation, Spain has 
preserved their territorial stability according to a broad consensus among parties and elites 
of a consociational nature. Spain has not followed literally the four features theorised by 
Arend Lijphart (1977). As regards autonomy in culture, this competency falls under the 
exclusive constitutional powers of all Comunidades Autónomas. Power sharing is de facto 
exercised in the daily practice of intergovernmental life by the great number of concurrent 
policies needing joint action. And parliamentary support of the nationalist parties to the 
central government has been so important as to reach in some cases the category of 
‘informal vetoes’ against possible decisions invading areas of their regional jurisdiction. 
Quota representation of minority groups in the state institutions and public sector has not 
been necessary. Other than the absence of discrimination against citizens from the 
‘historical nationalities’, or any other regions,25 minority nationalisms have set as a priority 
the achievement of influence and power in their own territories by means of controlling 
institutions of self-government and making eventual allegiances with central elites and 
government. 
 
In the general pattern of consociational practices and agreements which has facilitated 
federalization in Spain, Basque terrorism has highly conditioned not only the achievement 
of peace and stability in Euskalherria,26 but has also interfered in the general climate of 
inter-party agreement inside and outside the Basque Country. Let us remind that 
consociational practices between nationalists and non-nationalist parties to accommodate 
the various Spanish idiosyncrasies and identities were also the pattern for political 
agreement for most of the period of Basque home-rule since 1978. It remains to be seen 
whether those practices can return to the Basque Country despite the fact that electoral 
polarisation seems to reflect an increasing civil fracture (Moreno, 2004).  
 
                                            
25 The recruitment of state-wide civil servants in Spain has traditionally followed the French model of non-
discriminatory competitions. Conversely to the verzuiling system, or ‘pillarisation’ of Dutch society and 
politics, consociationalism in Catholic Spain has not developed according to the expectations and goals of 
the various cultural and religious ‘denominations’. 
26 For radical Basque nationalism, Euskalherria is a nation made up of the Spanish ‘historical territories’ 
(provinces) of Araba, Gipuzkoa, Biscay, as well as Navarre (all of these located in Spain) and the French 
districts of Labourd (Lapurdi), Soule (Zuberoa) and Lower Navarre (Behenafarroa) in the French 
département of the Atlantic Pyrenees. 
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Developments in the Basque Country have had un undeniable effect on the dynamics of 
agreements between state-wide political parties themselves, most of which also have federal 
or decentralised organic structures. The limited degree of enthusiasm raised by the 
constitutional reform in order to ‘federalise’ the Senate is based upon the reluctance to re-edit 
the same consensual climate which made possible the drafting of the 1978 Constitution, and 
which now appears rather difficult.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The ethno-lingual variety of Spain, a country which for most of its contemporary history 
has been governed by central actors, institutions and political forces that have traditionally 
been both weak through inefficacy and strong through violence, has too often resulted in 
damage to its unity. With the ongoing federalization old patterns of confrontation seem to 
have been overcome. Actions by both majority and minority nationalism put however into 
test the resilience of the general consensual pact inaugurated with the 1978 Constitution, 
and the consociational practices for territorial accommodation since then. 
 
The case of Spain’s Comunidades Autónomas illustrates the potentialities for 
accommodating different identities and aspirations for self-government within the 
framework of a plural polity. As in other formal multi-national federations or union-states, 
Spain can provide some useful contrasts on how to build macro communities of trust 
beyond single national sentiments and attachments. Such insights are most relevant 
concerning supra-national unions like the European Union (Moreno, 2002).  
 
Much alike future developments in the EU, Spain faces a variety of challenges on how to 
integrate --rather than to assimilate-- existing collective identities forged at the various 
levels of political legitimacy. If achieved by means of shared rule and self-rule it would 
avoid to be seen as an exogenous process, which is superimposed ‘from above’ by a 
central authority upon the internal interaction of communities with long-standing culture 
and history.∗
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